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Abstract
I study the extent of secure property rights a planner can implement. Agents can
produce output, appropriate others’ output, or work in property rights enforcement. The
planner pays enforcement personnel using taxes collected from producers who can hide in-
come from taxation at a cost. The planner implements perfectly secure property rights by
incentivizing production through redistributive taxation and absorbing potential appro-
priators as enforcement personnel. Both taxation and employment in enforcement insti-
tutionalize redistribution that would otherwise take place through appropriation. Higher
costs of hiding income permit more redistributive taxation and less enforcement, leading
to more production and higher welfare.
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1 Introduction
Secure property rights matter for economic outcomes (see, e.g., Knack and Keefer 1995; Hall
and Jones 1999; Acemoglu and Johnson 2005). A society looking to protect property rights
needs to commit designated resources. The availability of means to hide income from taxation
constrains society in its effort to collect these resources from its members. In the U.S., for
example, the Internal Revenue Service estimates that, from 2008 to 2010, on average more
than 16 percent of the total tax liability remained unpaid after enforced and late payments;
and that tax underreporting accounted for 85 percent of the gap before enforced payments.1
Does this complication in raising funds affect society’s choice of a property rights enforcement
regime? Can it by itself help explain imperfectly secure property rights and differences across
countries? That is, what could a planner achieve when agents can hide income from taxation
if there were no other complications, like political economy frictions or agency problems?
I address these questions in an environment related to Murphy et al. (1993) and Acemoglu
(1995). There are two types of agents with different productivities. Each agent can produce
output, appropriate others’ output, or work in enforcement. Those who produce output ac-
quire property rights over it—the right to consume it, and the right to exclude others from
consuming it. Protecting these property rights requires the planner to employ enforcement
personnel to counter appropriation activities. In the context of this paper, appropriation
activities are, for example, rent-seeking, corruption, theft and property crimes, fraud, or
extortion; and they do not target particular groups nor require any special skill.2 In the
first-best outcome both appropriation and enforcement are absent and property rights are
perfectly secure. However, a planner can neither force agents into an occupation nor verify
the true incomes of agents she wants to tax. Producers can misrepresent their income by
hiding some of it at a cost so as to be subject to a different tax payment.
Although this informational friction constrains the planner, as soon as she can improve on
anarchy, she does not tolerate any appropriation. She always achieves an outcome with per-
fectly secure property rights by employing enforcement personnel financed by redistributive
taxation. This policy resembles the link between institutional investment and redistribution
emphasized by Koeppl et al. (2014) for efficient contract enforcement in a production econ-
omy.3 Here, the planner may use subsidies to encourage unproductive agents to abstain from
1See Internal Revenue Service (2016). An estimate of the contribution of underreporting to the gap after
enforced payments is not available. Tax compliance between 2008 and 2010 was comparable to that in 2006
(see pp. 6 and 8). See, e.g., Andreoni et al. (1998) on tax underpayment and evasion; see, e.g., Quintin (2008)
on the link between limited contract enforcement, taxation, and informality.
2Tullock (1967), Rose-Ackerman (1975), and Becker (1968) started large literatures on some such activities.
The availability of these activities affects the allocation of talent and resources. See, e.g., Baumol (1990),
Murphy et al. (1991, 1993), Acemoglu (1995), and Acemoglu and Verdier (1998).
3On inequality, redistribution, and crime, see, e.g., Benoît and Osborne (1995), İmrohoroğlu et al. (2000).
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appropriation and instead contribute to the pie available to society. She uses the sector for
enforcement to absorb all those who do not produce and might otherwise engage in appro-
priation. Taxation and employment in enforcement institutionalize redistribution, replacing
appropriation. Higher costs of hiding income from taxation permit more income redistribu-
tion through taxation. A steeper tax schedule induces more agents to produce and allows the
planner to employ fewer enforcement personnel. More agents producing more output increases
aggregate consumption and welfare.
These results arise for three reasons. First, property rights are enforced by personnel whose
wellbeing the planner values. Second, more taxation maps directly into more enforcement.
While more taxation decreases the payoffs from both production and appropriation, more
enforcement makes production more profitable relative to appropriation. At the same time,
the planner pays enforcement personnel a fixed wage that needs to compensate them for their
forgone outside option. In equilibrium, this outside option is appropriation and deteriorates
with taxation and enforcement. It is thus always beneficial for the planner to tax producers
slightly more and hire more enforcement personnel. Doing so absorbs potential appropria-
tors and induces more agents to produce. The ability to subsidize unproductive producers
strengthens this effect. Third, in equilibrium, enforcement personnel is recruited from a pool
of agents that would otherwise engage in appropriation, not in production. Using unproduc-
tive rather than productive factors makes perfectly secure property rights affordable.
The literature explicitly linking taxation and property rights enforcement often focuses on
state capacity for these two activities (e.g., Besley and Persson 2009, 2010; Herrera and Mar-
tinelli 2013) and on rulers or elites that use that capacity to serve their own interests (e.g.,
Olson 1993; Moselle and Polak 2001; Konrad and Skaperdas 2012; Acemoglu 2005). When
considering taxation, important frictions arise from asymmetric information, which I model
here along the lines of Lacker and Weinberg (1989). Grochulski (2007) and Casamatta (2011)
study optimal taxation when taxes can be avoided by hiding income from taxation at a cost.
While the environment here features a similar ex post moral hazard problem, it differs as
agents can choose among three occupations which are directly affected or even established by
the planner’s choice of taxation and enforcement. The focus of this paper is also different: it
is on the consequences of the informational friction for the security of property rights rather
than for the optimal tax schedule. I do not address what determines the cost of hiding in-
come from taxation. This endogenous economic institution is the subject of the literature on
optimal income tax enforcement started by Reinganum and Wilde (1985), which connects to
the literature on tax evasion started by Allingham and Sandmo (1972).
I present the model in Section 2, its predictions in Section 3, and a discussion in Section 4.
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2 The Model
There is a unit measure of risk neutral agents of two types and a benevolent planner. A mea-
sure µl > 0 of agents has low productivity wl > 0 and a measure µh > 0 of agents has high
productivity wh > wl, where µl + µh = 1. Individual productivities are private information
and cannot be verified by the planner. Agents are endowed with one unit of time that is sup-
plied indivisibly to one of three mutually exclusive occupations. An agent of type i ∈ {l,h}
can either produce wi units of the consumption good, work as enforcement personnel for a cer-
tain wage we, or engage in activities that may or may not lead to successful appropriation of a
producer’s income. Let χji be the share of agents of type i ∈ {l,h} in occupation j ∈ {p, e, a},
where p, e, and a indicate production, enforcement, and appropriation, respectively.
After production, producers of type i display an income zi to the planner and pay a tax, or
collect a subsidy, t(zi) that is indexed by and may vary with the income they display.4 A tax
payment cannot exceed actual income. Producers of type h can pretend to be of type l by
displaying zh = wl so as to pay a different tax. To do so, they have to hide income wh −wl
at a cost captured by the function ψ : R+ → R+. While hiding nothing is costless, ψ(0) = 0,
the cost of hiding an amount x > 0 is strictly positive, but less than x: 0 < ψ(x) < x. Let-
ting φ ≡ ψ(wh −wl), thus φ ∈ (0, (wh −wl)). All income not hidden is publicly observable.
Producers can neither display more than their income nor hide all of it.5 The tax receipts are
used to hire enforcers who are recognizable and safe from appropriation. They, and only they,
can apprehend successful appropriators. Unsuccessful appropriators cannot be apprehended
or punished in any way because they have not actually violated anyone’s property rights.
Next, there are two rounds of random matching between agents. In the first round, appropri-
ation takes place. Every agent can meet either an appropriator, a producer, or an enforcer.
For any agent, the probability of meeting an agent of a certain type in a certain occupa-
tion is equal to the measure of agents of that type in that occupation. In particular, the
probability p of meeting an appropriator equals the share of appropriators in the population,
χal µl + χ
a
hµh. Similarly, the probability (1− θ) of meeting an enforcer is χelµl + χehµh; the
probability of meeting a producer of type i is χpiµi; the probability q of meeting any producer
at all is χpl µl + χ
p
hµh. If a producer meets an appropriator, then the appropriator takes and
runs off with all her resources, irrespective of whether or not they were hidden. That is, while
producers can hide income from the planner, they cannot hide it from appropriators in the
same way, because the latter do not face institutional or resource constraints, once they target
someone’s income. In all other meetings, no relevant interaction takes place: appropriators
do not carry resources and enforcers are recognizable, preventing appropriation attempts.
4Following Lacker and Weinberg (1989), this assumption is without loss of generality (see Appendix A).
5At the solution of the planner’s problem, agents of type l do not want to display wh, even if it is costless.
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Table 1
Timing
1. Regime Choice 2. Production 3. Enforcement 4. Meetings 5. Consumption
The planner Agents choose Taxes are collected Appropriation Agents consume
chooses and occupations and and enforcement and apprehension the resources they
enacts a regime. producers produce. personnel is paid. take place. have in hand.
In the second round, apprehension takes place. Successful appropriators—appropriators who
met a producer in the first round—meet another agent. If a successful appropriator meets an
enforcer, then the enforcer takes all the resources the appropriator carries and returns them to
the producer who was expropriated of them. That is, the probability of apprehension equals
the share of enforcement personnel in the population. The apprehended appropriator does
not incur any additional costs besides zero consumption. In all other meetings, no relevant
interaction takes place: successful appropriators cannot appropriate any more resources, can-
not be expropriated by unsuccessful appropriators, and can be apprehended only by enforcers.
After the second round of meetings, all agents consume the resources they carry.
The planner knows the productivity distribution captured by (µl,µh,wl,wh) and the cost
parameter φ. At the outset, she chooses shares of agents of each type in each occupation,
which also imply a measure of enforcement personnel to be employed, the tax schedule, and
the wage paid to enforcers in order to maximize aggregate welfare with equal weights for all
agents. After production, she collects taxes from producers, and pays enforcement personnel.
She has to maintain a balanced budget: the expenses for wages paid to enforcement personnel
have to equal the taxes collected, minus any subsidies. Table 1 summarizes the timing.
3 Analysis
I first specify the actions agents can take and the payoff functions these map into as well as
the planner’s objective function and problem to then state and discuss the implications of the
model. All proofs can be found in Appendix C.
3.1 Payoffs and the Planner’s Problem
A regime σ ≡ (χpl ,χel ,χal ,χph,χeh,χah, tl, th,we) ∈ Σ ≡ [0, 1]6 × [−wh,wl]× [−wh,wh]× [0,wh]
collects the occupational assignments as captured by the shares of agents of each type in
each occupation, the tax schedule, and the enforcement sector wage. All shares have to be
nonnegative and cannot exceed one; taxes cannot exceed incomes wl and wh, respectively;
and a natural bound on subsidies and the nonnegative wages in enforcement is the income wh
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the most productive agents in the economy can generate. The planner takes into account the
map from occupational choices (instructions) to the probabilities q, (1− θ), and p of meeting
a producer, an enforcer, or an appropriator, respectively, that is,
q = χpl µl + χ
p
hµh; (1− θ) = χelµl + χehµh; p = χal µl + χahµh.(1)
After displaying income zi at the cost ψ(wi− zi) and paying taxes t(zi), a producer with pro-
ductivity wi carries resources wi− t(zi)−ψ(wi− zi). Then, a producer meets an appropriator
with probability p, in which case she is expropriated of all her resources. With probability
(1− θ) an enforcer apprehends the appropriator and returns the resources; with probability
θ, the appropriator can run off with them. Therefore, the expected payoff an agent of type i
derives from production, when displaying income zi and paying both the designated tax t(zi)
for producers displaying zi and the associated cost ψ(wi − zi) of hiding income is given by
[(1− θ)p+ (1− p)] (wi − t(zi)−ψ(wi − zi)) = (1− θp)(wi − t(zi)−ψ(wi − zi)).
When a producer chooses an income to display, she maximizes her payoff from doing so.
However, the income display must be feasible and, given that the planner understands the
incentives to falsify income, consistent with all agents’ occupational choices: First, producers
can neither display a higher income than they have generated nor hide all income. Second, if a
producer were to display an income that, given the regime, no agent that produces generates,
then the planner catches that and punishes this producer prohibitively high. That is, the only
income display that is feasible for producers of type l is zl = wl. The associated tax payment
is t(wl) = tl. The expected payoff of a producer of type l is given by the function ϕl : Σ→ R,
ϕl(σ) = (1− θp)(wl − tl).(2)
A producer of type h can display zh ∈ {wl,wh}, if some agents of type l produce. If no agent
of type l produces, then the only income a producer of type h can display that is consistent
with σ is zh = wh. The tax payment associated with the income display wh is t(wh) = th.
Thus, given any regime σ ∈ Σ, the income display ζ(σ) of a producer of type h satisfies
ζ(σ) ∈ arg max
z∈Z(σ)
wh − t(z)−ψ(wh − z),
where
Z(σ) =
{wl,wh} if χ
p
l > 0,
{wh} otherwise,
6
is the set of all income displays zh that are consistent with the regime σ. To simplify notation,
I suppress the dependence on the regime σ and write ζ to mean ζ(σ) whenever there is no
risk of confusion. At the optimal income display ζ, the cost of hiding resources, ψ(wh− ζ), is
either zero if ζ = wh, or φ if ζ = wl. The expected payoff an agent of type h can derive from
producing and optimally displaying income is thus given by the function ϕh : Σ→ R,
ϕh(σ) = (1− θp)(wh − t(ζ)−ψ(wh − ζ)) = (1− θp)max{wh − th,wh − tl − φ}.(3)
Given σ, only appropriators that meet a producer carry resources after the first round of
meetings. In the second round of meetings, those successful appropriators escape apprehension
with probability θ. Only in this case do appropriators carry any resources after the meetings.
Therefore, the expected payoff from appropriation is proportional to the expectation of a
random draw from the set of producer incomes net of taxes and costs of hiding income. It is
independent of the appropriator’s productivity and thus the same for all appropriators. The
expected payoff from appropriation can be written as a function ν : Σ→ R given by
ν(σ) = θ [χpl µl(wl − tl) + χphµh(wh − t(ζ)−ψ(wh − ζ))] .(4)
Any agent that works as enforcement personnel receives a wage we with certainty and her
payoff from working in enforcement is thus we. The planner’s balanced budget is given by
(χelµl + χ
e
hµh)we = χ
p
l µltl + χ
p
hµht(ζ),(5)
implying that the tax receipts are nonnegative, because the wage bill of the enforcement sector
is. The planner’s objective function is aggregate welfare with equal weights for all agents:
χpl µlϕl(σ) + χ
p
hµhϕh(σ) + (χ
e
lµl + χ
e
hµh)we + (χ
a
l µl + χ
a
hµh)ν(σ).
Using the payoff expressions (2)–(4), the balanced budget (5), and the definitions of the
probabilities (1), which the planner understands, it can be written as (see Appendix B)
χpl µlwl + χ
p
hµhwh − χphµhψ(wh − ζ).(6)
That is, the planner’s problem is to choose a regime σ consisting of shares of agents of each
type in each occupation, a tax schedule, and a wage in enforcement in order to maximize
total production minus the cost of hiding all income that is being hidden. As she cannot
dictate individual occupations, her choice of a regime needs to be incentive compatible in the
sense that no agent should expect a higher payoff from switching occupations. In addition,
the budget has to be balanced and the shares of agents of each type in each occupation have
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to add up to one. The planner’s problem is
max
σ∈Σ
χpl µlwl + χ
p
hµhwh − χphµhψ(wh − ζ)(PP)
s.t. (χelµl + χehµh)we = χ
p
l µltl + χ
p
hµht(ζ);(7)
ϕi(σ) ≥ max {we, ν(σ)} if χpi > 0, ∀i;(8)
we ≥ max {ϕi(σ), ν(σ)} if χei > 0, ∀i;(9)
ν(σ) ≥ max {ϕi(σ),we} if χai > 0, ∀i;(10)
χpi + χ
e
i + χ
a
i = 1, ∀i;(11)
q = χpl µl + χ
p
hµh; (1− θ) = χelµl + χehµh; p = χal µl + χahµh.(12)
The objective function is expression (6). Constraint (7) requires the budget to be balanced.
Constraint (8) says that a producer, that may choose to display a false income if she is of type
h, should be at least as well off as she would be by taking up an activity in enforcement or
appropriation. Similarly, constraints (9) and (10) require agents of either type that work in
enforcement or appropriation to find it optimal to do so, instead of deviating to, for example,
producing and hiding income in case they are of type h. Constraint (11) requires that the
shares of agents of each type in each occupation add up to one. Constraint (12) states that
the planner understands and takes into account how the shares of agents in all occupations
map into the probabilities that enter the expected payoffs.
3.2 Anarchy and The First-Best Outcome
Before I study Problem (PP), in this section, I discuss two extreme scenarios: anarchy and
the first-best outcome. First, suppose that there is neither a planner nor any other governing
authority so that no taxes are collected and no enforcement personnel is hired, i.e., χel =
χeh = tl = th = we = 0. In this case, in an equilibrium, all agents choose to engage in
either production or appropriation in order to maximize their expected payoff, taking all
other agents’ occupational choices as given. I refer to this situation as anarchy.
Proposition 1. In anarchy, any share of agents of type h produces, all others appropriate.
In anarchy, appropriation implements redistribution. If some agents of type h produce out-
put, then some redistribution takes place by appropriators taking resources from them after
production. In particular, if all agents of type h produce, then appropriation redistributes
income to those who are not productive enough to choose to engage in production themselves.
Without taxation and enforcement, redistribution can only occur through appropriation.
I next describe the first-best outcome and show that there is a regime with incentive compat-
ible occupations that attains it. Suppose that the planner is only constrained by technology
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and resources—or agents’ productivities and endowments with time. That is, besides choos-
ing a tax schedule and the enforcement sector wage, she can dictate all agents’ occupations,
irrespective of whether or not agents agree with those occupation assignments, and verify
producers’ taxable incomes. The tax schedule can depend on actual income, rather than
displayed income, and no costs from hiding income are incurred. The planner only has to
balance the budget and ensure that all shares add up to one. Her problem is
max
σ∈Σ
χpl µlwl + χ
p
hµhwh(FBP)
s.t. (χelµl + χehµh)we = χ
p
l µltl + χ
p
hµhth;
χpi + χ
e
i + χ
a
i = 1, ∀i.
The following proposition characterizes the first-best outcome.
Proposition 2. The first-best regime has all agents produce, collects total tax receipts equal
to zero, and implements no enforcement at all.
This first-best outcome derives from two aspects. First, both appropriation and enforcement
are unproductive. Any agent that appropriates or enforces does not produce and thus not
contribute to the pie the planner has available for distribution. Hence, the planner instructs
all agents to produce so as to maximize output. Second, linear utility implies that the planner
does not have an a priori incentive to redistribute resources among agents through transfers.
Hence, any tax schedule that at most redistributes income through tax payments and subsi-
dies is efficient—not implementing redistribution through the tax schedule at all thus is.
If the planner cannot dictate individual occupational choices, then she chooses incentive com-
patible occupations, the wage paid in enforcement, and the tax schedule, which can still
depend on actual income. Her problem is
max
σ∈Σ
χpl µlwl + χ
p
hµhwh(FBP′)
s.t. (χelµl + χehµh)we = χ
p
l µltl + χ
p
hµhth;
(1− θp)(wi − ti) ≥ max
{
we, θ [χpl µl(wl − tl) + χphµh(wh − th)]
}
if χpi > 0, ∀i;(13)
we ≥ max
{
(1− θp)(wi − ti), θ [χpl µl(wl − tl) + χphµh(wh − th)]
}
if χei > 0, ∀i;(14)
θ [χpl µl(wl − tl) + χphµh(wh − th)] ≥ max {(1− θp)(wi − ti),we} if χai > 0, ∀i;(15)
χpi + χ
e
i + χ
a
i = 1, ∀i;
q = χpl µl + χ
p
hµh; (1− θ) = χelµl + χehµh; p = χal µl + χahµh.(16)
The additional constraints (13)–(15) ensure that all agents can expect a payoff from their
occupation—production, enforcement, or appropriation—that is at least as high as the maxi-
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mum payoff they could obtain from either one of the alternative occupations. Constraint (16)
ensures that the occupational choices are consistent with the probabilities of meeting agents
in certain occupations. The solution to Problem (FBP′) implements the first-best outcome.
Proposition 3. There is a unique first-best regime with incentive compatible occupations. It
has all agents produce, equalizes after-tax incomes, and implements no enforcement at all.
The planner instructs all agents to produce so as to maximize the pie. She then collects taxes
and subsidizes unproductive agents with transfers paid for by productive agents. The transfers
equalize consumption across agents so as to incentivize abstention from appropriation in favor
of production. No resources are spent on enforcement at all. The intuition is unchanged:
appropriation and enforcement do not contribute to the pie available to society.
3.3 Unverifiable Incomes
In this section, I study Problem (PP). A number of insights allow to simplify the problem.
First, as is intuitive, the planner chooses to employ the most productive agents in production.
Lemma 1. All agents of type h produce.
The planner can always achieve at least the best possible anarchy regime: a regime in which
all agents of type h produce, all agents of type l appropriate, and no taxes are collected at all
satisfies all constraints of Problem (PP) and attains a value of µhwh. Suppose that a strictly
positive share of agents of type l produces, and that those agents find it optimal to do so.
Then, θp < 1 and the after-tax income matters. As the cost φ of hiding income (wh −wl)
satisfies φ < (wh −wl), the after-tax income of producers of type h is
max{wh − th,wh − tl − φ} ≥ wh − tl − φ > wh − tl − (wh −wl) = wl − tl.(17)
That is, the payoff an agent of type h derives from production is strictly greater than that
of an agent of type l. Hence, if agents of type l at least weakly prefer production over the
other two occupations, then all agents of type h strictly prefer production over the other
occupations. Individually optimal occupational choice then requires that all agents of type
h produce. That is, production of all agents of type h is attainable; and if agents of type l
produce, then so do all agents of type h.
The only way for the planner to do better than anarchy is for the allocation to also have some
agents of type l produce. Any such regime departs from the first-best regime.
Lemma 2. Some enforcement is implemented if some agents of type l produce.
As indicated by inequality (17), the planner cannot equalize after-tax incomes, because pro-
ducers of type h can hide income from taxation. Thus, redistributive taxation alone cannot
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sufficiently counteract the incentive to engage in appropriation activities when other agents
produce. The planner has to hire agents of type l as enforcement personnel. As becomes clear
in the proof of Lemma 2, if there was no enforcement at all, then these agents would choose
to be appropriators. That is, enforcement personnel is hired from a pool of agents that would
otherwise engage in appropriation. When raising taxes to pay for them, in order to prevent
deadweight loss, the planner avoids tax schedules that induce income to be hidden.
Proposition 4. The tax schedule precludes hidden income if some agents of type l produce.
This result resembles the no-falsification theorem proven by Grochulski (2007). For any regime
that induces producers of type h to hide income from taxation, there is an alternative regime
in the constraint set, with a different tax schedule, that induces producers to display their
true income and increases welfare. The resources that would be spent on hiding income in
the original regime are collected as additional tax receipts that can be used to lower taxes on
producers and pay higher wages to enforcers. As the shares of agents of each type in each
occupation are the same in both regimes, they produce the same output. However, unlike in
the original regime, in the alternative regime all output is consumed.
From Proposition 4 it thus follows that, if χpl > 0, the regime induces truthful income displays,
so that ζ = wh, ψ(wh − ζ) = 0, and t(ζ) = th. As all agents of type h produce by Lemma 1,
implying that θp < 1, it then follows from equation (3) that the tax schedule has to satisfy
wh − th ≥ wh − tl − φ.(18)
Agents of type h should not be willing to display income wl and incur both the associated tax
payment tl and the cost φ of hiding output (wh −wl). This requirement can be rewritten as
th ≤ tl + φ.(19)
Inequality (19) reveals that the tax schedule cannot be too steep: the tax payment th desig-
nated for a producer with high income wh cannot be too much higher than the one designated
for a producer with lower income wl. As one would expect, the upper bound on the difference
between the two designated tax payments is determined by the cost of hiding income from
taxation. Together, and as taxes cannot exceed incomes, inequalities (17) and (18) imply
wh − th > wl − tl ≥ 0.(20)
That is, more productive producers require a higher after-tax income than less productive
producers. As χpl > 0, it then follows from constraint (8) that agents of type h strictly
prefer production over the other two occupations, because ϕh(σ) > ϕl(σ) ≥ max {we, ν(σ)},
which is consistent with χph = 1 and χeh = χah = 0. Therefore, constraints (8), (9), and (10)
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corresponding to agents of type h can be ignored. For agents of type l, constraints (8), (9),
and (10) imply indifference among all three occupations.
Lemma 3. Agents of type l are indifferent among occupations if some agents of type l produce.
If some agents of type l produce, then some enforce, implying that constraints (8) and (9) have
to hold for i = l. Combining them, agents of type l should derive the same expected payoff
from production and enforcement. If the share of agents of type l in appropriation is strictly
positive, then appropriation should provide the same expected payoff as well. However, the
expected payoffs to agents of type l from all three occupations have to be equal to each other
even when no agent of type l engages in appropriation activities. The reason is that, in order
for them to abstain from appropriation in favor of another activity, agents of type l need only
be made at least as well off as if they engaged in appropriation. If production and enforcement
promised a strictly greater expected payoff than appropriation, then the planner could afford
to move some enforcement personnel into the production sector, thereby increasing output,
adjusting taxes appropriately, without changing the relevant meeting probabilities enough to
make appropriation profitable. That is, a regime that offers agents of type l a strictly higher
expected payoff in production and enforcement than it offers in appropriation is dominated
by another regime in the constraint set that does not.
Combining the insights of Lemmas 1–3 and Proposition 4, if the candidate solution σ has some
agents of type l produce, then it has to solve a simplified version of Problem (PP), focusing
on regimes in the subset Σ′ ≡ [0, 1]3×{1}× {0}× {0}× [−wh,wl]× [−wh,wh]× [0,wh] ⊂ Σ,
with generic element σ = (χpl ,χel ,χal , 1, 0, 0, tl, th,we). The simplified planner’s problem is
max
σ∈Σ′
χpl(PP′)
s.t. χelµlwe = χ
p
l µltl + µhth;(21)
tl + φ ≥ th;(22)
ϕl(σ) = we;(23)
we = ν(σ);(24)
χpl + χ
e
l + χ
a
l = 1;(25)
q = χpl µl + µh; (1− θ) = χelµl; p = χal µl.(26)
As no income is hidden, the planner’s objective function is aggregate output. It is maximized
by maximizing the share of agents of type l that join the agents of type h in production. The
constraint set of Problem (PP′) is a subset of that of Problem (PP). By Lemmas 1–3 and
Proposition 4, and the details of their proofs, for all regimes σ with χpl > 0 in the constraint
set of Problem (PP), either σ or another regime σˆ with χˆpl > 0 that is associated with a higher
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objective function value than σ is in the constraint set of Problem (PP′). Constraints (23)
and (24) together state that an agent of type l should expect the same payoff from all three
occupations. Both appropriators and enforcers are agents of type l and cannot pretend to
have produced wh, were they to deviate to production. As before, but accounting for the fact
that all agents of type h produce, constraint (21) requires a balanced budget; constraint (25)
requires that the shares of agents of type l in all occupations add up to one; and the equalities
collected in constraint (26) state that the planner understands and takes into account how
these shares map into the meeting probabilities. Constraint (22) indicates that the difference
between the tax payments designated for producers of types l and h is bounded by the cost of
hiding income from taxation. In fact, the planner exhausts this bound by setting taxes that
make producers of type h indifferent among income displays.
Lemma 4. Producers of type h are indifferent among displays if some agents of type l produce.
The planner implements a tax schedule such that th = tl + φ. Redistributive taxation is
one means of inducing rather unproductive agents to abstain from appropriation and engage
in production instead. Unlike enforcement personnel, who are paid from the tax receipts
collected, agents of type l that redistribution induces to produce do contribute to the pie
available to society. The planner’s regime exhausts the bound on the difference between the
taxes facing productive and unproductive producers to exploit the advantages of redistributive
taxation as much as possible. This aspect plays an important role in discarding appropriation.
Proposition 5. The allocation precludes appropriation if some agents of type l produce.
If a regime in which some agents of type l produce also has some agents of type l engage in
appropriation, then the planner can reallocate some of those appropriators to production, and
reassign the rest of them to the enforcement sector. As a result property rights are perfectly
secure, which would compensate producers for higher taxes, should financing the wage bill
of the grown enforcement sector command them. While more production tends to increase
the expected payoff from appropriation, the higher number of enforcement personnel and, if
required, the higher taxes paid by producers tend to decrease it. As a consequence, high
enough wages in enforcement to compensate would-be appropriators are affordable.
Combining the above insights, the solution to the planner’s problem can be fully characterized.
Proposition 6. Problem (PP) has a solution. If φ ≤ φ ≡ (µhwh− (1+µlµh)wl)/(1+µlµh),
then the planner cannot improve on the best anarchy regime: all agents of type h produce, and
only those. If φ > φ, then there is a unique solution: all agents of type h and some agents
of type l produce, all agents that do not produce are employed in enforcement. If the costs of
hiding income from taxation are high enough, then producers of type l receive a subsidy.
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For some parameter constellations, the planner cannot improve on the best anarchy regime if
the cost of hiding income from taxation is too small. In this case, the planner’s capacity to
raise taxes is constrained enough to prevent her from financing enough redistribution and en-
forcement. The planner can improve on anarchy if the cost of hiding income satisfies φ > φ.6
Using µl = 1−µh, the lower bound φ increases with (i) increases in the measure µh of agents
of type h, all of whom will be producers; (ii) increases in the productivity wh of producers
of type h; (iii) decreases in the productivity wl of producers of type l; and (iv) increases in
inequality in the sense of a mean-preserving spread with the shares of agents in the population
held constant. More producers of type h, more productive producers of type h, less produc-
tive producers of type l, and more inequality all increase the incentive for agents of type l to
engage in appropriation. More redistribution and enforcement are required to counteract this
increased incentive. Thus, in order to improve on anarchy, the planner needs to raise more
taxes, and hence requires more capacity for taxation, as measured by higher costs of hiding
income from it. I discuss parameter constellations that are consistent with φ > φ in Section
4 below. To the extent that a society does not seem to be in anarchy, φ > φ does represent
the relevant subset of the parameter space. The planner’s solution then improves on anarchy,
and absent any other frictions it provides an upper bound on this society’s outcome.
If the planner can improve on anarchy, then she employs enough enforcement personnel so
as to crowd out appropriation altogether, and property rights are perfectly secure. She does
so by absorbing potential appropriators into the sector for enforcement for a certain wage.
Appropriation is never attempted. Enforcement personnel does not actually provide a ser-
vice other than being present—and thus effectively deterring appropriation efforts. Being
employed in enforcement largely amounts to refraining from appropriation. The wage paid in
enforcement amounts to a transfer financed by taxing producers. Employment in enforcement
thus institutionalizes redistribution that would otherwise take place through appropriation.
While taxes may distort the occupational choice between production and appropriation, higher
tax payments decrease the expected payoffs from both activities. This effect is present in gen-
eral, independent of the exact tax schedule in place, and as long as utility is increasing. Thus,
taxation affects the choice between either one of those two occupations and employment in
enforcement. Too high taxes may draw productive agents (as well as appropriators) into the
enforcement sector. The threat of expropriation of the resources an agent carries, however,
affects the occupational choice between production and appropriation—as does the proba-
bility of apprehension. Intermediated by the sector for enforcement, taxation increases the
probability of productive agents being able to reap the returns to their productive activity,
which increases the incentive to produce. At the same time, the incentive to engage in appro-
6There is a φ < φ so that if φ ∈ [φ,φ], no feasible regime improves on anarchy, but some avoid appropriation.
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priation activities decreases because the probability of escaping apprehension after successful
appropriation decreases. That is, more agents prefer to produce. This effect, too, is present
in general, independent of the exact tax schedule in place, and as long as utility is increas-
ing. In addition, unproductive agents lean more towards switching to an occupation in the
enforcement sector. Thus, the planner optimally employs rather unproductive members of
society that do not produce as enforcement personnel at a wage that makes them indifferent
between enforcement and appropriation. As she absorbs all potential appropriators into the
enforcement sector, there is no appropriation and property rights are perfectly secure.
This security of property rights derives from the availability of a sector for enforcement of
those rights because it provides an alternative occupation. That occupation is unproductive,
as is appropriation. However, in contrast to appropriation, it does not harm the incentives
of more productive agents to actually produce. Perfectly secure property rights are not too
costly because enforcement personnel is recruited from a pool of agents that would otherwise
engage in appropriation. While enforcers do not produce, enforcement does not withdraw
agents from productive activities. Moreover, the resources spent on enforcement finance the
consumption of enforcement personnel, which the planner values.
The tax profile that finances enforcement is redistributive. High income agents pay higher
taxes than—and may even finance transfers to—low income agents. In fact, the tax facing
producers of type l is negative if the cost of hiding income is high enough. Negative taxes for
unproductive producers subsidize their production, which contributes to the pie society has
available for distribution amongst its members. These subsidies also incentivize abstention
from appropriation, which would hurt others’ incentives to produce. Redistributive taxation
thus plays an important role, and it is easier to implement it in societies in which it is more
costly for agents to hide income from taxation.
Proposition 7. Let φ > φ. Societies with higher costs of hiding income from taxation enact
a steeper tax profile with a smaller minimum tax, employ fewer enforcement personnel at a
higher wage, see more productive activity, produce more output, and experience higher welfare.
That is, if the costs of hiding income from taxation are higher, then the planner can implement
more redistribution through taxation. She can and does then choose to employ fewer agents
in enforcement and to enact a steeper tax profile, with a larger difference between the tax
payments facing productive and unproductive agents. That steeper tax profile—possibly
offering (larger) subsidies to unproductive producers—encourages some agents to produce
that would choose to enforce if the tax schedule were to implement less redistribution. As a
consequence, fewer agents work in enforcement and more agents produce more output that can
be shared among the members of society, which increases welfare. As aggregate consumption
rises, agents employed in enforcement share in that rise via higher wages.
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4 Discussion
In this section, I briefly discuss a number of assumptions. For example, I assume that the plan-
ner maximizes aggregate welfare with equal weights for all agents. I take the view that there
is no a priori reason to exclude appropriators’ welfare from the planner’s considerations—or
assign a smaller weight to it. Appropriation is a form of redistribution; and the planner’s
solution institutionalizes another one, using taxation and enforcement. The assumption of
linear utility ensures that the planner does not have an inherent desire to redistribute income.
All redistribution the planner implements is thus driven by the need to provide agents with
incentives. Strictly concave utility would intensify the planner’s desire to both redistribute
incomes across agents and reduce the uncertainty implied by insecure property rights.
I assume that the probability of any agent meeting another agent in a certain occupation
equals the measure of agents in that occupation. In particular, for any agent, the probability
of meeting an appropriator equals the measure of appropriators, i.e., the share of appropria-
tors in the population. Acemoglu (1995) and İmrohoroğlu et al. (2000), among others, use a
similar specification. While it simplifies the analysis, it shares qualitative features with other
specifications, such as a constant returns to scale matching function: all else equal, more
appropriators and fewer producers increase the probability of meeting an appropriator. In
fact, this specification is unfriendly towards the results. The assumption that the probability
of apprehension equals the share of enforcement personnel in the population makes secure
property rights more costly than others. Among all concave (production) functions mapping
the share of enforcement personnel in the population into a probability of apprehension, with
zero and one mapping into zero and one, respectively, a linear function gives a lower proba-
bility than any strictly concave function everywhere in the interior of the domain. Similarly,
successful appropriators that are apprehended by enforcement personnel are not subject to
any punishment other than zero consumption (see, e.g., Becker 1968; Stigler 1970; Ehrlich
1973, and many others). Here, imposing a potentially costly punishment might make it easier
to induce abstention from appropriation. However, the regime the planner chooses in the
present environment remains attainable in that case.
One could assume that enforcement personnel may explicitly divert the resources recovered
from apprehended appropriators without changing the results. The solution to the planner’s
problem I analyze would still be attainable, dominate all other regimes, and leave no room
for such a deviation as there is no appropriation in the first place. In fact, the possibility of
corrupt enforcement personnel grabbing resources themselves is captured to the extend that
appropriation activities are a stylized description of unproductive redistribution of resources,
including corruption. Moreover, in order to focus on a planner facing the friction that income
can be hidden from taxation, I do not consider corruptible tax collectors (see, e.g., Chander
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and Wilde 1992; Besley and McLaren 1993; Hindriks et al. 1999). I thus abstract from an
analysis of government agents’ incentives and their implications altogether (see, e.g., Becker
and Stigler 1974; Basu et al. 1992; Mookherjee and Png 1995; Acemoglu and Verdier 1998,
2000; Polinsky and Shavell 2001). The lack of a choice of effort to exert when an agent is
employed in enforcement seems to be less relevant than the possibility of diverting recovered
resources. Given the latter option, enforcement personnel would want to ensure a high prob-
ability of apprehending successful appropriators.
Proposition 6 distinguishes between two cases and states that for the planner to be able to
improve on anarchy, the condition φ > φ = (µhwh − (1+ µlµh)wl)/(1+ µlµh) must hold.
A sufficient condition for this requirement to be satisfied for all φ > 0 is that φ ≤ 0, or
(1+ µlµh)wl ≥ µhwh. This inequality can be rewritten as (1− µ2h)wl = (1− µh(1− µl))wl ≥
µh(wh −wl). A sufficient condition for it to hold therefore is that the income that all agents
of type l could generate is at least as high as the potential hidden income of all agents of
type h: µlwl ≥ µh(wh − wl). If one is willing to think of the U.S. as a benchmark repre-
sented by the first-best outcome in the rather stylized environment here, then this condition
in principle allows the parameters to qualitatively capture at least some aspects of the U.S.
income distribution. For example, according to some measures, from 1917 to 2014 the in-
come share of the top 10 percent has always been less than 50 percent (Piketty et al. 2018).
That is, the income share of the lower 90 percent was larger than that of the top 10 percent.
Letting µh = 0.1 and µl = 0.9, the income share of the top 10 percent in the first-best is
µhwh/(µlwl + µhwh), while that of the lower 90 percent is µlwl/(µlwl + µhwh). Any wl > 0
and wh > wl such that µlwl ≥ µhwh would be qualitatively consistent with this data and
satisfy the parameter restriction µlwl ≥ µh(wh − wl). Clearly, imposing µlwl ≥ µhwh, and
thus looking at the top 10 percent versus the lower 90 percent, is far from necessary to satisfy
the condition µlwl ≥ µh(wh −wl), which itself is sufficient for φ > 0 ≥ φ to hold. Similarly,
not requiring φ ≤ 0 allows to further relax restrictions on the productivity distribution.
According to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (2016), improved visibility in the sense of
information reporting and tax withholding improves tax compliance. Andreoni et al. (1998)
argue that it is more difficult to hide income from taxation in developed countries than it
is to do the same in developing ones, and that income derived from farms or sole propri-
etorship is particularly prone to evasion (p. 821). In addition, Schneider and Enste (2000)
point to a role for the informal sector in tax evasion and provide estimates of its size to show
that it is more prevalent in developing and transition economies than in developed countries.
Therefore, while the analysis here abstracts from many important dimensions along which
countries at different stages of development differ, a possible interpretation of the level of
costs of hiding income from taxation might be as follows. One could imagine a society with
a well governed and equipped tax authority; with a well developed financial market in which
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participants have effective screening devices available, and many companies are required to
regularly report to, and are subject to audits by agents of, other participants; with a relatively
important heavy and manufacturing industry, and a relatively less important agrarian sector;
and with relatively many big enough companies that require a well established organizational
form with cross-checks and within-firm bureaucracy to operate effectively. One could also
imagine another society with an understaffed tax authority; with a large informal sector; with
a relatively important agrarian sector; with large rural areas that are far behind the urban
centers, both technologically and administratively; in which most firms are small enterprises,
with a single owner often being the single employee. One might expect that it would be more
difficult and thus costly to hide income and escape reporting duties in the former society.
5 Conclusion
In a model of appropriation and endogenous enforcement of property rights, I analyzed what
a planner can achieve when she is unable to verify taxable incomes. I find that this friction
cannot by itself help explain imperfectly secure property rights. Although it induces a bind-
ing and effective constraint on the planner’s regime choice, as soon as she can improve on
anarchy, it does not prevent her from implementing perfectly secure property rights. To do
so, she uses a mix of redistributive taxation and employment of potential appropriators in
enforcement. When higher costs of hiding income from taxation allow for more redistribution
through taxation, the planner chooses to absorb fewer agents in enforcement and subsidize
more unproductive producers.
Appendices
A Tax Schedules
I briefly replicate the argument given in Lacker and Weinberg (1989) for this environment. A
mechanism consists of a message spaceM and a tax schedule t that maps the message and the
income displayed into R. A producer w chooses a message m(w) ∈M and an income display
z(w) to maximize w − t(m(w), z(w)) − ψ(w − z(w)). Suppose two agents with different
productivities w1 and w2 6= w1 were to send different messages m(w1) = m1 and m(w2) =
m2 6= m1 but display the same income z(w1) = z(w2) = zˆ. By optimality of message and
display, for agent w1, t(m1, zˆ) ≤ t(m2, zˆ), while for agent w2, t(m1, zˆ) ≥ t(m2, zˆ), so that
t(m1, zˆ) = t(m2, zˆ). The same income display implies the same tax payment, irrespective of
the message, which justifies focusing on tax schedules that only depend on displayed income.
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B The Planner’s Objective Function
Using the payoff expressions (2)–(4), the balanced budget (5), and the definitions of the
probabilities (1), which the planner understands, the planner’s objective function is given by
χpl µlϕl(σ) + χ
p
hµhϕh(σ) + (χ
e
lµl + χ
e
hµh)we + (χ
a
l µl + χ
a
hµh)ν(σ)
= (1− θp)[χpl µl(wl − tl) + χphµh(wh − t(ζ))]− (1− θp)χphµhψ(wh − ζ)
+ [χpl µltl + χ
p
hµht(ζ)] + θp [χ
p
l µl(wl − tl) + χphµh(wh − t(ζ))]− θpχphµhψ(wh − ζ)
= χpl µl(wl − tl) + χphµh(wh − t(ζ))− χphµhψ(wh − ζ) + χpl µltl + χphµht(ζ)
= χpl µlwl + χ
p
hµhwh − χphµhψ(wh − ζ).
C Proofs
Proposition 1
Proof. In anarchy, σ = (χpl , 0,χal ,χ
p
h, 0,χah, 0, 0, 0), ϕi(σ) = (1− p)wi, i = l,h, and ν(σ) =
(χpl µlwl + χ
p
hµhwh), where p = χal µl + χahµh and χai = 1− χpi , i = l,h. First, in equilibrium,
χpl = 0. Suppose for a contradiction that χ
p
l > 0. Then, it must hold that ϕh(σ) > ϕl(σ) ≥
ν(σ) so that all agents of type h produce, χph = 1. It follows that ν(σ) = (χ
p
l µlwl + µhwh) >
(χpl µl + µh)wl = (1− p)wl = ϕl(σ), a contradiction. Thus, χpl = 0 and χal = 1. For any
χph ∈ [0, 1], ϕh(σ) = (1− p)wh = (1− µl − χahµh)wh = (µh − χahµh)wh = (1− χah)µhwh =
χphµhwh = ν(σ) ≥ χphµhwl = (1− p)wl. That is, any profile of occupational choices that
has any share of agents of type h producing and all other agents appropriating maximizes all
agents’ expected payoffs, given all others’ occupational choices, and thus is an equilibrium. 
Proposition 2
Proof. The objective function in Problem (FBP) is less than or equal to w¯ = µlwl+µhwh and
equals w¯ if and only if χpl = χ
p
h = 1 so that χel = χeh = 0, implying χ
p
l µltl + χ
p
hµhth = 0. 
Proposition 3
Proof. The objective function in Problem (FBP′) is less than or equal to w¯ = µlwl + µhwh
and equals w¯ if and only if χpl = χ
p
h = 1 so that χel = χeh = 0, implying χ
p
l µltl + χ
p
hµhth = 0.
Consider the regime given by χpl = χ
p
h = 1, χel = χeh = χal = χah = 0, tl = wl− w¯, th = wh− w¯,
and we = 0. The tax receipts equal µl(wl − w¯) + µh(wh − w¯) = µlwl + µhwh − (µl + µh)w¯ =
w¯− w¯ = 0. As p = 0, (1− θp)(wi− ti) = w¯; as θ = 1, θ [χpl µl(wl − tl) + χphµh(wh − th)] = w¯.
Thus, this regime satisfies all constraints of Problem (FBP′) and implements the first-best. It
is the only regime that does so: if wl − tl 6= wh − th, then constraint (13) is violated for one
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of the two types of agents as θ [χpl µl(wl − tl) + χphµh(wh − th)] = µl(wl − tl) + µh(wh− th) >
min{wl − tl,wh − th}; if wl − tl = wh − th, then the balanced budget, together with zero tax
receipts after transfers, implies that wl − tl = wh − th = w¯. 
Lemma 1
Proof. First, production by all agents of type h can be attained. Consider the regime σ that has
all agents of type h produce and is given by χph = χal = 1, χeh = χah = χ
p
l = χ
e
l = 0, tl = th = 0,
we = 0. Then, θ = 1 and p = µl so that ϕh(σ) = (1− µl)wh = µhwh, ϕl(σ) = (1− µl)wl =
µhwl, and ν(σ) = µhwh. Therefore, ϕh(σ) ≥ max{we, ν(σ)} and ν(σ) ≥ max{ϕl(σ),we}.
Thus, σ satisfies all constraints of Problem (PP) and is thus attainable.
Second, if any agents of type l produce, then all agents of type h produce. Consider a candidate
regime σ and suppose for a contradiction that χpl > 0 and χ
p
h < 1. Then, θp < 1 so that
ϕh(σ) = (1− θp)max{wh − th,wh − tl − φ} ≥ (1− θp)(wh − tl − φ) > (1− θp)(wh − tl −
(wh − wl)) = (1− θp)(wl − tl) = ϕl(σ), because wh − wl > φ. But, as χpl > 0, constraint
(8) requires that ϕl(σ) ≥ max{we, ν(σ)}. That is, ϕh(σ) > max{we, ν(σ)}, which violates
at least one of the constraints (9) and (10), as χph < 1 implies via constraint (11) that either
χeh > 0, or χah > 0, or both. Thus, σ is not in the constraint set of Problem (PP), a
contradiction that completes the proof. 
Lemma 2
Proof. Consider a candidate regime σ and suppose for a contradiction that χpl > 0 and
χel = 0. As χ
p
h = 1 by Lemma 1, χeh = χel = 0 and thus θ = 1. Therefore, p = 1− q so that
ϕl(σ) = (1− p)(wl− tl) = q(wl− tl). At the same time, ν(σ) = χpl µl(wl− tl) +µhmax{wh−
th,wh− tl−φ} ≥ χpl µl(wl− tl) +µh(wh− tl−φ) > χpl µl(wl− tl) +µh(wh− tl− (wh−wl)) =
χpl µl(wl − tl) + µh(wl − tl) = q(wl − tl), because wh −wl > φ. That is, ν(σ) > ϕl(σ), which
violates constraint (8), because χpl > 0. Thus, σ is not in the constraint set of Problem (PP),
a contradiction that completes the proof. 
Proposition 4
Proof. Consider any regime σ with χph = 1, χ
p
l > 0, and, by Lemma 2, χel > 0 that satisfies all
constraints of Problem (PP) and induces producers of type h to hide income from taxation.
That is, wh− tl − φ > wh− th. The value of the objective function is χpl µlwl + µhwh−µhφ. I
show that there is an alternative regime σˆ in the constraint set which has the same occupation
assignments but a different tax schedule that prevents income from being hidden and so
increases welfare, and thus dominates σ. There are two cases: χal = 0 and χal > 0.
First, suppose χal = 0. Then, p = 0, (1− θ) = χelµl = 1− q, and from constraints (8) and (9)
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for agents of type l, ϕl(σ) = we ≥ ν(σ), or
wl − tl = we = (χelµl)−1 (χpl µltl + µhtl) ≥ (1− χelµl) [χpl µl(wl − tl) + µh(wh − tl − φ)] .
Let  = µhµl+µhφ and let σˆ be given by χˆ
j
i = χ
j
i for all i, j, tˆh = tl + φ− , tˆl = tl − , and
wˆe = we + . Then, producers of type h do not hide income as wh − tˆh = wh − tl − φ+  =
wh − tˆl − φ, which is also greater than wl − tˆl, because wh −wl > φ, so that ϕh(σˆ) > ϕl(σˆ).
Also, ϕl(σˆ) = wl − tˆl = wl − tl +  = we +  = wˆe and the tax receipts increase to
χpl µl tˆl + µhtˆh = χ
p
l µl(tl − ) + µh(tl + φ− ) = χpl µltl + µhtl + µhφ− q = χelµlwe + (1− q)
or χelµlwe + χelµl, because µhφ = (µl + µh) =  from  =
µh
µl+µh
φ and 1− q = 1− θ, which
is strictly greater than zero and exactly enough to pay all χelµl enforcers wˆe, while
ν(σˆ) = (1− χelµl) [χpl µl(wl − tl + ) + µh(wh − tl − φ+ )]
= (1− χelµl) [χpl µl(wl − tl) + µh(wh − tl − φ)] + (1− χelµl)q < ν(σ) + .
That is, ϕl(σˆ) = wˆe > ν(σˆ) so that σˆ satisfies all constraints in Problem (PP) but, saving
the cost of hiding income, yields a higher objective function value, χpl µlwl + µhwh, than σ,
and thus dominates it.
Second, suppose χal > 0. Then, p > 0 and, as σ obeys all constraints, ϕl(σ) = we = ν(σ) or
(1− θp)(wl − tl) = we = (χelµl)−1 (χpl µltl + µhtl) = θ [χpl µl(wl − tl) + µh(wh − tl − φ)] .
Let l = µhµl+µhφ(1+ (1− θ)θ)−1(θ−1 − p)−1 > 0 and h =
µl+µh
µh
(θ−1 − p− χpl µl)l and let σˆ
be given by χˆji = χ
j
i for all i, j, tˆh = tl + φ− h, tˆl = tl − l, and wˆe = we + (1− θp)l. Then,
h > l because µ−1h (θ−1 − p− χpl µl) > 1 as θ−1 > 1 > χal µl + χpl µl + µh, so that producers
of type h do not hide income as wh − tˆh = wh − tl − φ+ h > wh − tl − φ+ l = wh − tˆl − φ,
which is also greater than wl− tˆl, because wh−wl > φ, so that ϕh(σˆ) > ϕl(σˆ). Also, ϕl(σˆ) =
(1− θp)(wl − tˆl) = (1− θp)(wl − tl) + (1− θp)l = we+ (1− θp)l = wˆe and the tax receipts
increase to, using the definition of l to replace µhφ = (µl + µh)(1+ (1− θ)θ)(θ−1− p)l, the
expression for h, the budget equation, and the fact that (1− θ) = χelµl,
χpl µl tˆl + µhtˆh = χ
p
l µl(tl − l) + µh(tl + φ− h)
= χpl µltl + µhtl + µhφ− µhh − χpl µll
= (χpl µltl + µhtl) + (1+ (1− θ)θ)(θ−1 − p)l − (θ−1 − p− χpl µl)l − χpl µll
= χelµlwe + (1− θ)l − (1− θ)θpl + χpl µll − χpl µll
= χelµlwe + χ
e
lµl(1− θp)l
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= χelµl(we + (1− θp)l)
= χelµlwˆe,
which is strictly greater than zero and exactly enough to pay all χelµl enforcers wˆe, while
ν(σˆ) = θ [χpl µl(wl − tl + l) + µh(wh − tl − φ+ h)]
= θ [χpl µl(wl − tl) + µh(wh − tl − φ)] + θ(χpl µll + µhh)
= ν(σ) + θ(χpl µll + (θ
−1 − p− χpl µl)l)
= ν(σ) + (1− θp)l.
That is, ϕl(σˆ) = wˆe = ν(σˆ) so that σˆ satisfies all constraints in Problem (PP) but, saving
the cost of hiding income, yields a higher objective function value, χpl µlwl + µhwh, than σ,
and thus dominates it, which completes the proof. 
Lemma 3
Proof. Consider any regime σ with χph = 1, χ
p
l > 0, and, by Lemma 2, χel > 0 that satisfies all
constraints of Problem (PP). Following Proposition 4, σ also induces ζ = wh, ψ(wh− ζ) = 0,
and t(ζ) = th. First, as χpl > 0 and χel > 0, combining constraints (8) and (9) gives
ϕl(σ) ≥ max {we, ν(σ)} ≥ we ≥ max {ϕl(σ), ν(σ)} ≥ ϕl(σ),
implying that ϕl(σ) = we. Second, if χal > 0, then the inequality in constraint (10) has to be
satisfied and combining it with constraint (9) yields
ν(σ) ≥ max {ϕl(σ),we} = we ≥ max {ϕl(σ), ν(σ)} ≥ ν(σ),
implying that ϕl(σ) = we = ν(σ). Finally, suppose that χal = 0. Then, the inequality in
constraint (10) may or may not be satisfied. Suppose that we > ν(σ). I show that there is
another regime σˆ with wˆe = ν(σˆ) that is associated with higher welfare and thus dominates
σ. Given the regime σ, χel = 1− χpl > 0, p = 0, θ = 1− χelµl, and ϕl(σ) = we > ν(σ) or
wl − tl = we = (χelµl)−1 (χpl µltl + µhth) > (1− χelµl) [χpl µl(wl − tl) + µh(wh − th)] > 0.
The tax receipts implied by σ are bounded away from zero by ν(σ) as, by inequality (20),
wh − th > wl − tl ≥ 0. There exists an  > 0 such that, using q = (χpl µl + µh),
wl − tl +  > (χelµl)−1 (χpl µltl + µhth − q) > (1− χelµl) [χpl µl(wl − tl) + µh(wh − th) + q] .
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(The tax receipts are still bounded away from zero.) There exists a δ > 0, δ < χel such that
wl − tl +  > (χelµl − δµl)−1 (χpl µltl + µhth − q+ δµl(tl − ))
> (1− χelµl + δµl) [χpl µl(wl − tl) + µh(wh − th) + q+ δµl(wl − tl + )] .
(The tax receipts are still bounded away from zero.) Then, there exists a κ > 0 such that
wl − tl +  > (χelµl − δµl)−1 (χpl µltl + µhth − q+ δµl(tl − )− µhκ)
= (1− χelµl + δµl) [χpl µl(wl − tl) + µh(wh − th) + q+ δµl(wl − tl + ) + µhκ] .
(The receipts are still positive.) Then, there are γl > 0 and γh = − (χ
p
l
+δ)µl
µh
γl < 0 such that
wl − tl + − γl
= (χelµl − δµl)−1 (χpl µltl + µhth − q+ δµl(tl − )− µhκ+ (χpl + δ)µlγl + µhγh)
= (1− χelµl + δµl)[χpl µl(wl − tl) + µh(wh − th) + q+ δµl(wl − tl + ) + µhκ
− (χpl + δ)µlγl − µhγh],
because (χpl + δ)µlγl + µhγh = 0, (The tax receipts have not changed.) or, more compactly,
wl − (tl − + γl)
= ((χel − δ)µl)−1 ((χpl + δ)µl(tl − + γl) + µh(th − − κ+ γh))
= (1− (χel − δ)µl) [(χpl + δ)µl(wl − (tl − + γl)) + µh(wh − (th − − κ+ γh))] ,
or, even more compactly,
wl − tˆl = (χˆelµl)−1 (χˆpl µl tˆl + µhtˆh) = (1− χˆelµl) [χˆpl µl(wl − tˆl) + µh(wh − tˆh)] ,
where χˆpl = χ
p
l + δ > 0, χˆel = χel − δ > 0, χˆal = χal = 0, tˆl = tl − + γl, tˆh = th − − κ+ γh.
Letting wˆe = (χˆelµl)−1 (χˆ
p
l µl tˆl + µhtˆh) and σˆ = (χˆ
p
l , χˆel , χˆal , 1, 0, 0, tˆl, tˆh, wˆe) gives ϕl(σˆ) =
wˆe = ν(σˆ). As wh − th ≥ wh − tl − φ by inequality (18), wh − tˆh ≥ wh − tˆl − φ > wl − tˆl
is satisfied, implying both no hidden income and ϕh(σˆ) > ϕl(σˆ), and the tax receipts are
strictly positive. Therefore, σˆ satisfies all constraints of Problem (PP) but yields a higher
objective function value than σ, because χˆpl = χ
p
l + δ > χ
p
l , which completes the proof. 
Lemma 4
Proof. Consider any solution σ to Problem (PP′). From constraint (22) it has to hold that
tl + φ ≥ th. The following argument is independent of whether p = 0 or p > 0. Suppose for a
contradiction that tl+φ > th, implying that (1− θp)(wh− th) > (1− θp)(wh− tl−φ). Then,
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there exist an h > 0 and (as χpl > 0) an l = − µhχp
l
µl
h < 0 such that tl + φ+ l = th + h, or
tl + φ = th +
(
1+ µh
χpl µl
)
h.
Let t˜i = ti + i. As t˜l + φ = tl + φ+ l = th + h = t˜h, as φ < (wh −wl),
(1− θp)(wh − t˜h) = (1− θp)(wh − t˜l − φ) > (1− θp)(wl − t˜l)(27)
and, starting from ϕl(σ) = we = ν(σ), as t˜l < tl, using l = − µhχp
l
µl
h and θ = 1− χelµl,
(1− θp)(wl − t˜l) > we = (χelµl)−1 (χpl µl t˜l + µht˜h)
= (χelµl)
−1 (χpl µltl + µhth + χ
p
l µll + µhh)
= (χelµl)
−1 (χpl µltl + µhth)
= ν(σ)
= (1− χelµl) [χpl µl(wl − tl) + µh(wh − th))]
= (1− χelµl) [χpl µl(wl − tl) + µh(wh − th)− χpl µll − µhh]
= (1− χelµl) [χpl µl(wl − t˜l) + µh(wh − t˜h)] ,
because χpl µll + µhh = 0. The tax receipts implied by σ are bounded away from zero by
ν(σ) as, by inequality (20), wh − th > wl − tl ≥ 0. In fact, due to ϕl(σ) = we = ν(σ) > 0,
wl − tl > 0. The last set of inequalities and equalities can be summarized as
(1− θp)(wl − t˜l) > (χelµl)−1 (χpl µl t˜l + µht˜h) = (1− χelµl) [χpl µl(wl − t˜l) + µh(wh − t˜h)] > 0.
Then, there exists a γ > 0, γ < wl − t˜l (< wh − t˜h by (27)), such that, letting t¯i = t˜i + γ,
(1− θp)(wl − t¯l) > (χelµl)−1 (χpl µl t¯l + µht¯h) > (1− χelµl) [χpl µl(wl − t¯l) + µh(wh − t¯h)] > 0.
Then, irrespective of whether p = 0 or p > 0, there exists a δ¯1 > 0, δ¯1 < χel , such that, using
θ = 1− χelµl, for all δ1 ∈ [0, δ¯1],
(1− (1− (χel − δ1)µl)p)(wl − t¯l) > ((χel − δ1)µl)−1 ((χpl + δ1)µl t¯l + µht¯h) ,
(note: t¯l could be negative) as well as a δ¯2 > 0, δ¯2 < χel , such that, for all δ2 ∈ [0, δ¯2],
((χel − δ2)µl)−1 ((χpl + δ2)µl t¯l + µht¯h)
> (1− (χel − δ2)µl) [(χpl + δ2)µl(wl − t¯l) + µh(wh − t¯h)] > 0.
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Let δ = min{δ¯1, δ¯2}. Then,
(1− (1− (χel − δ)µl)p)(wl − t¯l) > ((χel − δ)µl)−1 ((χpl + δ)µl t¯l + µht¯h)
> (1− (χel − δ)µl) [(χpl + δ)µl(wl − t¯l) + µh(wh − t¯h)] > 0.
Let χˆpl = χ
p
l + δ > 0, χˆel = χel − δ > 0, χˆal = χal ≥ 0, pˆ = χˆal µl = χal µl = p, and θˆ = (1− χˆelµl).
Then, there exists an η > 0 such that, letting t˘i = t¯i − η,
(1− θˆpˆ)(wl − t˘l) > (χˆelµl)−1 (χˆpl µl t˘l + µht˘h) = θˆ [χˆpl µl(wl − t˘l) + µh(wh − t˘h)] > 0.
Then, there are a κl > 0 and a κh = − χˆ
p
l
µl
µh
κl < 0 such that, letting tˆi = t˘i + κi,
(1− θˆpˆ)(wl − tˆl) = (χˆelµl)−1 (χˆpl µl tˆl + µhtˆh)
= (χˆelµl)
−1 (χˆpl µl t˘l + µht˘h + χˆ
p
l µlκl + µhκh)
= (χˆelµl)
−1 (χˆpl µl t˘l + µht˘h)
= θˆ [χˆpl µl(wl − t˘l) + µh(wh − t˘h)]
= θˆ [χˆpl µl(wl − t˘l) + µh(wh − t˘h)− χˆpl µlκl − µhκh]
= θˆ [χˆpl µl(wl − tˆl) + µh(wh − tˆh)] > 0,
because χˆpl µlκl + µhκh = 0, or, summarizing these equations,
(1− θˆpˆ)(wl − tˆl) = (χˆelµl)−1 (χˆpl µl tˆl + µhtˆh) = θˆ [χˆpl µl(wl − tˆl) + µh(wh − tˆh)] > 0.
Letting wˆe = (χˆelµl)−1 (χˆ
p
l µl tˆl + µhtˆh) and σˆ = (χˆ
p
l , χˆel , χˆal , 1, 0, 0, tˆl, tˆh, wˆe), the last equation
implies ϕl(σˆ) = wˆe = ν(σˆ). The tax receipts are still bounded away from zero. Since
tl + l + φ = th + h, as established in the very beginning, and κl > 0 while κh < 0, it holds
that tl + l + γ− η+ κl + φ > th+ h+ γ− η+ κh so that tˆl + φ > tˆh. Hence, constraint (22)
is satisfied and wh − tˆh > wl − tˆl. Therefore, σˆ satisfies all constraints of Problem (PP′) but
yields a higher objective function value than σ, because χˆpl = χ
p
l + δ > χ
p
l , a contradiction. 
Proposition 5
Proof. Consider any solution σ to Problem (PP′) and suppose for a contradiction that some
agents of type l engage in appropriation. I show in two steps that there is another regime
in the constraint set that attains a higher objective function value and does not have any
appropriators. First, starting from σ, I show that the planner can reallocate all appropriators
to enforcement and find a tax increase for all producers as well as a wage in enforcement such
that no agent wants to deviate to an occupation different from the amended occupation pre-
scriptions. Second, starting from this amended regime, I show that the planner can reallocate
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some of these enforcers to production and find a tax schedule as well as a wage in enforcement
such that all constraints of Problem (PP′) are satisfied, while more agents produce, which
increases the objective function value.
As χpl > 0, χel > 0 by Lemma 2. Following Lemma 4, th = tl + φ. Then, writing out the pay-
offs ϕl(σ) and ν(σ) in constraints (23) and (24), using constraint (26) to replace p with χal µl
and χelµl with (1− θ) and constraint (25) to replace χal with 1−χpl −χel , so that p = χal µl =
(1− χpl − χel )µl = µl − χpl µl − (1− θ) = θ + µl − χpl µl − µl − µh = θ − (χpl µl + µh) = θ − q,
where the last equality follows from constraint (26), the solution σ to Problem (PP′) satisfies
th = tl + φ,(28)
(1− θ(θ− q))(wl − tl) = we,(29)
(1− θ)we = (χpl µltl + µhth) ,(30)
we = θ [χ
p
l µl(wl − tl) + µh(wh − th)] ,(31)
θ− q ≥ 0.(32)
Inequality (32) ensures that χal ≥ 0. The assumption that some agents of type l engage in
appropriation implies that χal > 0 and thus θ > q. Combining equations (29)–(31), we have
(1− θ(θ− q))(wl − tl) = (1− θ)−1 (χpl µltl + µhth) = θ [χpl µl(wl − tl) + µh(wh − th)] > 0,
(33)
where we = (1− θ)−1 (χpl µltl + µhth) from (30), as χel > 0 implies that (1− θ) > 0. All
payoffs are strictly positive as wh − th > wl − tl ≥ 0 by equation (20), implying that
θ [χpl µl(wl − tl) + µh(wh − th)] > 0, and thus wl − tl > 0.
Step 1. First, reallocating all (θ− q) appropriators to enforcement, keeping all other agents
in their occupation, implies that θ˜ = q < θ, 1− θ˜ = 1− q > 1− θ, so that the payoffs satisfy
wl − tl > max
{
(1− q)−1 (χpl µltl + µhth) , q [χpl µl(wl − tl) + µh(wh − th)]
}
> 0,(34)
because, compared to (33), 1 > (1− θ(θ− q)), (1− q)−1 < (1− θ)−1, and q < θ. There are
two cases: either, case (a), θ(1− θ) ≥ q(1− q) or, case (b), θ(1− θ) < q(1− q).
Case (a). Suppose that θ(1− θ) ≥ q(1− q). In this case, equation (34) can be written as
wl − tl > (1− q)−1 (χpl µltl + µhth) ≥ q [χpl µl(wl − tl) + µh(wh − th)] ,(35)
because from (33),
(χpl µltl + µhth) = (1− θ)θ [χpl µl(wl − tl) + µh(wh − th)] ,
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so that
(1− q)−1 (χpl µltl + µhth) = (1− q)−1(1− θ)θ [χpl µl(wl − tl) + µh(wh − th)]
≥ q [χpl µl(wl − tl) + µh(wh − th)] ,
as θ(1− θ) ≥ q(1− q). Therefore, from (35), there exists an  > 0 such that
wl − tl −  = (1− q)−1 (χpl µl(tl + ) + µh(th + )) > q [χpl µl(wl − tl − ) + µh(wh − th − )] .
(36)
All payoffs are still strictly positive as (χpl µltl + µhth) > 0 from (33), so that, for  > 0,
(χpl µl(tl + ) + µh(th + )) > 0, implying that wh − th −  > wl − tl −  > 0. That is, taxing
all producers that additional  > 0 allows to reallocate all those who were assigned to ap-
propriation in the original regime σ to enforcement, and to pay all, now (1− q), enforcement
personnel the wages required, i.e., (1− q)−1 (χpl µl(tl + ) + µh(th + )), such that no agent
wants to deviate to appropriation and all agents of type l are indifferent between production
and enforcement.
Case (b). Suppose that θ(1− θ) < q(1− q). In this case, equation (34) can be written as
wl − tl > q [χpl µl(wl − tl) + µh(wh − th)] > (1− q)−1 (χpl µltl + µhth) ,(37)
by a similar argument as above. There exists an 1 > 0 such that, using q = χpl µl + µh,
wl − tl − 1 = (1− q)−1 (χpl µl(tl + 1) + µh(th + 1))
= (1− q)−1 (χpl µltl + µhth) + (1− q)−1q1.
Multiplying by (1− q) and using (χpl µltl + µhth) = (1− θ)(1− θ(θ− q))(wl − tl) from (33),
1 = [(1− q)− (1− θ)(1− θ(θ− q))] (wl − tl).
Similarly, there exists an 2 > 0 such that, again using q = χpl µl + µh,
(1− q)−1 (χpl µltl + µhth) + (1− q)−1q2 = (1− q)−1 (χpl µl(tl + 2) + µh(th + 2))
= q [χpl µl(wl − tl − 2) + µh(wh − th − 2)]
= q [χpl µl(wl − tl) + µh(wh − th)]− q22.
Multiplying both sides by (1− q) and collecting terms gives
(q+ (1− q)q2)2 = (1− q)q [χpl µl(wl − tl) + µh(wh − th)]− (χpl µltl + µhth) ,
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and using (χpl µltl + µhth) = (1− θ)(1− θ(θ− q))(wl− tl) and [χpl µl(wl − tl) + µh(wh − th)] =
θ−1(1− θ(θ− q))(wl − tl) from (33) gives
2 =
1
q(1+ (1− q)q)
[
(1− q)qθ−1 − (1− θ)
]
(1− θ(θ− q))(wl − tl).
We have that 1 > 2, because
[(1− q)− (1− θ)(1− θ(θ− q))] > 1
q(1+ (1− q)q)
[
(1− q)qθ−1 − (1− θ)
]
(1− θ(θ− q)).
To verify this claim, multiply both sides by θq(1+ (1− q)q) to get
(1+ (1− q)q) [θq(1− q)− qθ(1− θ)(1− θ(θ− q))] > [(1− q)q− θ(1− θ)] (1− θ(θ− q))
and note that, as q ∈ (0, 1) and (1− θ(θ− q)) < 1,
(1+ (1− q)q) [θq(1− q)− qθ(1− θ)(1− θ(θ− q))]
> [θq(1− q)− qθ(1− θ)(1− θ(θ− q))]
> [θq(1− q)− qθ(1− θ)]
> [(1− q)q− θ(1− θ)]
> [(1− q)q− θ(1− θ)] (1− θ(θ− q)),
where the third inequality holds because, as q ∈ (0, 1) and 1− θ > 0,
θq(1− q)− qθ(1− θ) > (1− q)q− θ(1− θ)
⇔ θ(1− θ)− qθ(1− θ) > (1− q)q− θq(1− q)
⇔ θ(1− θ)(1− q) > (1− q)q(1− θ)
⇔ θ > q,
which holds by assumption. Therefore, as 1 > 2,
wl − tl − 1 = (1− q)−1 (χpl µl(tl + 1) + µh(th + 1))
> (1− q)−1 (χpl µl(tl + 2) + µh(th + 2))
= q [χpl µl(wl − tl − 2) + µh(wh − th − 2)]
> q [χpl µl(wl − tl − 1) + µh(wh − th − 1)] ,
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so that there is an  = 1 > 0 such that
wl − tl −  = (1− q)−1 (χpl µl(tl + ) + µh(th + )) > q [χpl µl(wl − tl − ) + µh(wh − th − )] .
(38)
Again, all payoffs are still strictly positive as (χpl µltl + µhth) > 0 from (33), so that, for
 > 0, (χpl µl(tl + ) + µh(th + )) > 0, implying that wh − th −  > wl − tl −  > 0. That
is, again, taxing all producers that additional  > 0 allows to reallocate all those who were
assigned to appropriation in the original regime σ to enforcement, and to pay all, now (1− q),
enforcement personnel the wages required, i.e., (1− q)−1 (χpl µl(tl + ) + µh(th + )), such that
no agent wants to deviate to appropriation and all agents of type l are indifferent between
production and enforcement. As summarized by equations (36) and (38), irrespective of
whether θ(1− θ) ≥ q(1− q) or θ(1− θ) < q(1− q), there exists an  > 0 such that increasing
the taxes for all producers by that amount allows to support the wage bill for all enforcers,
once all appropriators are reallocated to enforcement, and no agent wants to deviate from the
planner’s amended occupational prescriptions.
Step 2. Second, starting from the planner’s amended occupational prescriptions and taxes
that satisfy (38), which is the same as (36), there is a tax decrease γ > 0 such that
wl − tl − + γ > (1− q)−1 (χpl µl(tl + − γ) + µh(th + − γ))
> q [χpl µl(wl − tl − + γ) + µh(wh − th − + γ)] > 0.
Then, using q = χpl µl + µh, there exists a δ¯1 > 0, δ¯1 < χel , such that, for all δ1 ∈ [0, δ¯1],
wl − tl − + γ > (1− ((χpl + δ1)µl + µh))−1 ((χpl + δ1)µl(tl + − γ) + µh(th + − γ))
(note: tl + − γ could be negative) as well as a δ¯2 > 0, δ¯2 < χel , such that, for all δ2 ∈ [0, δ¯2],
(1− ((χpl + δ2)µl + µh))−1 ((χpl + δ2)µl(tl + − γ) + µh(th + − γ))
> ((χpl + δ2)µl + µh) [(χ
p
l + δ2)µl(wl − tl − + γ) + µh(wh − th − + γ)] .
Then, letting δ = min{δ¯1, δ¯2} > 0, so that 0 < δ < χel , reallocating enforcers to production,
wl − tl − + γ > (1− ((χpl + δ)µl + µh))−1 ((χpl + δ)µl(tl + − γ) + µh(th + − γ))
> ((χpl + δ)µl + µh) [(χ
p
l + δ)µl(wl − tl − + γ) + µh(wh − th − + γ)] .
Now, there is a tax decrease η > 0 such that
wl − tl − + γ + η
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> (1− ((χpl + δ)µl + µh))−1 ((χpl + δ)µl(tl + − γ − η) + µh(th + − γ − η))
= ((χpl + δ)µl + µh) [(χ
p
l + δ)µl(wl − tl − + γ + η) + µh(wh − th − + γ + η)] > 0.
Then, there are a tax changes κl > 0 and κh = − (χ
p
l
+δ)µl
µh
κl < 0 such that
wl − tl − + γ + η− κl
= (1− ((χpl + δ)µl + µh))−1 ((χpl + δ)µl(tl + − γ − η+ κl) + µh(th + − γ − η+ κh))
= (1− ((χpl + δ)µl + µh))−1((χpl + δ)µl(tl + − γ − η) + µh(th + − γ − η)
+ (χpl + δ)µlκl + µhκh)
= (1− ((χpl + δ)µl + µh))−1((χpl + δ)µl(tl + − γ − η) + µh(th + − γ − η)
+ (χpl + δ)µlκl − (χpl + δ)µlκl)
= ((χpl + δ)µl + µh) [(χ
p
l + δ)µl(wl − tl − + γ + η) + µh(wh − th − + γ + η)]
= ((χpl + δ)µl + µh)[(χ
p
l + δ)µl(wl − tl − + γ + η) + µh(wh − th − + γ + η)
− (χpl + δ)µlκl − µhκh]
= ((χpl + δ)µl + µh) [(χ
p
l + δ)µl(wl − tl − + γ + η− κl) + µh(wh − th − + γ + η− κh)] .
Therefore, letting χˆpl = χ
p
l + δ, χˆel = 1− χˆpl , χˆal = 0, tˆl = tl + − γ − η + κl, tˆh = th + −
γ − η + κh, and wˆe = (χˆelµl)−1 (χˆpl µl tˆl + µhtˆh) = (1− (χˆpl µl + µh))−1 (χˆpl µl tˆl + µhtˆh) > 0,
the regime σˆ = (χˆpl , χˆel , χˆal , 1, 0, 0, tˆl, tˆh, wˆe) implies a balanced budget and satisfies
wl − tˆl = wˆe = (χˆelµl)−1 (χˆpl µl tˆl + µhtˆh) = (χˆpl µl + µh) [χˆpl µl(wl − tˆl) + µh(wh − tˆh)] ,
i.e., ϕl(σˆ) = wˆe = ν(σˆ), as well as tˆl + φ ≥ tˆh, because tl + φ = th and κl > 0 > κh so that
tl + − γ − η+ κl + φ ≥ th + − γ − η+ κh,
and, finally, χˆpl = χ
p
l + δ > 0 and χˆel = 1− χˆpl = 1−χpl − δ = χal +χel − δ > χal > 0 as χpl > 0,
χel > 0, χal > 0 and 0 < δ < χel . Thus, σˆ satisfies all constraints of Problem (PP′) but yields
a higher objective function value than σ, because χˆpl = χ
p
l + δ > χ
p
l , a contradiction. 
Proposition 6
Proof. Following Lemma 1, any solution satisfies χp∗h = 1, χe∗h = χa∗h = 0. Following Lemmas
2–3 and Proposition 4, and the details of their proofs, if a solution σ satisfies χpl > 0, then it
has to solve Problem (PP′): the objective function is aggregate output, which is maximized
by maximizing χpl , and for all regimes σ with χ
p
l > 0 in the constraint set of Problem (PP),
either σ or another regime σˆ with χˆpl > 0 that is associated with a higher objective function
value than σ is in the constraint set of Problem (PP′). Problem (PP′) has a solution if the
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constraint set is nonempty, because the objective function is continuous and the constraint
set is a closed subset of Σ′, which is compact. There are two cases.
Case 1. Suppose there is no regime with χpl > 0 in the constraint set of Problem (PP′), which
includes the case in which the constraint set is empty. By Lemmas 1–3 and Proposition 4, and
the details of their proofs, for all regimes σ with χpl > 0 in the constraint set of Problem (PP),
either σ or another regime σˆ with χˆpl > 0 that is associated with a higher objective function
value than σ is in the constraint set of Problem (PP′). Thus, if there is no regime with χpl > 0
in the latter, then there are no regimes with χpl > 0 in the constraint set of Problem (PP).
In this case, as there is no feasible regime with χpl > 0, the solution to Problem (PP) is any
regime that has χp∗l = 0 and all agents of type h produce, χ
p∗
h = 1, and attains an objective
function value of µhwh. The planner cannot do better than the best anarchy regime.
Case 2. Suppose there is a regime σ with χpl > 0 in the constraint set of Problem (PP′).
Then, the constraint set is nonempty, Problem (PP′) has a solution σ∗, and any such solution
σ∗ has χp∗l > 0, because χ
p
l > 0 is attainable. In addition, following Lemma 4 and Proposition
5, any such solution σ∗ satisfies t∗h = t∗l + φ and χa∗l = 0. Thus, χ
p∗
l > 0, χe∗l = 1− χp∗l > 0,
and χa∗l = 0, while χ
p∗
h = 1 and χe∗h = χa∗h = 0, so that there are no appropriators and,
as θ = q and (1 − θ) = (1 − q), all (1 − q) agents that do not produce are employed in
enforcement. Combining these insights with constraints (21)–(26), the following holds: If
there is a regime σ with χpl > 0 in the constraint set of Problem (PP′), then a solution σ∗ to
Problem (PP′) exists and satisfies both χp∗l > 0 and the system of equations (39)–(43), where
th = tl + φ,(39)
wl − tl = we,(40)
(1− θ)we = (χpl µltl + µhth) ,(41)
we = θ [χ
p
l µl(wl − tl) + µh(wh − th)] ,(42)
θ = χpl µl + µh.(43)
Equations (39)–(43) are five equations in five unknowns χpl , tl, th, we, and θ. For a solution
to this system to be consistent with χp∗l > 0, it has to satisfy θ = χ
p
l µl + µh > µh. Using
(39), (40), and (43) to replace th, we, and (χpl µl + µh) in (41) and (42) gives
(1− θ)(wl − tl) = θtl + µhφ,(44)
wl − tl = θ[χpl µlwl + µhwh]− θ2tl − θµhφ.(45)
Rewriting (44) yields
tl = (1− θ)wl − µhφ,(46)
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which using (40) gives
we = θwl + µhφ,(47)
both as functions of parameters and θ. Plugging tl into (45) gives
wl − (1− θ)wl + µhφ = θ[χpl µlwl + µhwh]− θ2((1− θ)wl − µhφ)− θµhφ
⇔ θwl + µhφ = θ[χpl µlwl + µhwh]− θ2wl + θ2θwl + θ2µhφ− θµhφ
⇔ (1− θ2)(θwl + µhφ) = θ[χpl µlwl + µhwh − θwl − µhφ]
⇔ (1− θ2)(θwl + µhφ) = θ[χpl µlwl + µhwh − (χpl µl + µh)wl − µhφ]
⇔ (1− θ2)(θwl + µhφ) = θµh(wh −wl − φ),
i.e., one equation in one unknown, θ. Thus, suppressing parameters, let h : (0, 1)→ R be
h(θ) = θµh(wh −wl − φ)− (1− θ2)(θwl + µhφ).(48)
For all φ ∈ (0, (wh −wl)), h is a strictly convex function of θ with
lim
θ→0
h(θ) = −µhφ < 0 and lim
θ→1
h(θ) = µh(wh −wl − φ) > 0,
and thus has a unique root θ∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that h(θ∗) = 0. An increase in φ decreases h(θ)
for all θ, and thus increases θ∗. Via (43), (46), (39), and (47), the unique θ∗ implies unique
χp∗l = µ
−1
l (θ
∗ − µh),(49)
t∗l = (1− θ∗)wl − µhφ,(50)
t∗h = t
∗
l + φ,(51)
w∗e = θ
∗wl + µhφ,(52)
completing the unique solution to system (39)–(43). As θ∗ ∈ (0, 1) and φ ∈ (0, (wh −wl)),
this unique solution satisfies χp∗l < 1, t∗l ∈ [−wh,wl], t∗h ∈ [−wh,wh], and w∗e ∈ [0,wh]. It is
consistent with χp∗l > 0 if and only if θ∗ > µh. If θ∗ ≤ µh, then the unique solution to (39)–
(43) does not satisfy χp∗l > 0. Then, by the statement in italics above, there is no regime with
χpl > 0 in the constraint set of Problem (PP′), and case 1 applies. The condition θ∗ > µh is
satisfied and case 2 applies (is violated and case 1 applies) if, plugging µh into h,
h(µh) = µ
2
h(wh −wl − φ)− (1− µ2h)(µhwl + µhφ) < (≥) 0
⇔ µh(wh −wl − φ) < (≥) (1− µ2h)(wl + φ)
⇔ (1+ µh(1− µh))φ > (≤) µhwh − (1+ µh(1− µh))wl
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⇔ (1+ µhµl)φ > (≤) µhwh − (1+ µhµl)wl
⇔ φ > (≤) φ ≡ µhwh − (1+ µlµh)wl
(1+ µlµh)
,
which is the stated condition. If φ > φ, combining the unique solution to system (39)–(43)
with χe∗l = 1− χp∗l > 0, χa∗l = 0, χp∗h = 1, and χe∗h = χa∗h = 0 gives the unique solution σ∗.
Finally, suppose φ > φ. Then, from (50), t∗l = (1− θ∗)wl − µhφ. From the definition of h in
(48), with φ → (wh −wl), h(θ) → −(1− θ2)(θwl + µh(wh −wl)) < 0 for all θ < 1, so that
θ∗ → 1 with φ → (wh −wl): for all  > 0, h(1− ) < 0 for some φ ∈ (0, (wh −wl)), φ close
enough to (wh −wl), so that θ∗ > 1− . Thus, t∗l → −µh(wh −wl) < 0 with φ→ (wh −wl).
It follows that for high enough φ, t∗l < 0, which completes the proof. 
Proposition 7
Proof. The function h as defined in equation (48) is a strictly convex function of θ, negative-
valued for θ approaching zero and switching sign with θ approaching one, therefore has a
positive derivative at its unique root θ∗, and a higher φ decreases it for all θ. Hence, θ∗
increases with φ. As φ > φ, (49)–(52) apply. From (49), χp∗l increases, so that χe∗l = 1− χp∗l
decreases; from (52), w∗e increases, as it increases in both θ∗ and φ; from (50), t∗l decreases, as
it decreases in both θ∗ and φ; and from (51) the difference t∗h − t∗l = φ increases with φ. 
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